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Summary findings
Juris shows how, in the United Kingdom, government  generated through the flexibility mechanism to choose
and industry participants have responded to challenges  the balancing measures with the lowest cost to society.
created by opening the natural gas industry to  Juris analyzes the four mechanisms used in physical gas
competition.  He concludes that, as a result of  markets, describes developments in the U.K.'s financial
cooperation between the government and industry  gas market, and describes pipeline capacity trading in
participants, appropriate mechanisms can be established  primary and secondary markets and BGT's pricing of
for operating and balancing the system and for trading  capacity and transportation  services.
natural gas and transportation  capacity. The deintegrated  The most important  issue today, says Juris, is whether
natural gas industry in the United Kingdom is off to a  industry participants can reach a consensus on how to
promising start after a long gestation.  enhance the existing framework to make markets more
Juris describes the processes of the Network  Code, a  efficient. Development of the underdeveloped financial
market-based method for balancing the pipeline system  gas market will require cooperation between BGT and
and optimizing transportation by British Gas TransGo  the Office oif  Gas Supply to give the International
(BGT), the transportation and storage arm of British Gas  Petroleum Exchange access  to BGT's electronic network,
(formerly the publicly owned monopoly transporter  and  so that it car record and settle transactions. Both BGT
supplier of natural gas). The Network Code is a set of  and its customers will need to contribute time and
rules that determine how users of the pipeline system  resources to developing an efficient tariff structure for
cooperate with the system operator when seeking  pipeline capacity and transportation services in the
transportation  services.  The operator  uses price signals  contract and tariff markets.
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Deregulation and structural reforms in the natural gas industries of many countries have
prompted questions about how far deregulation should go and whether markets in natural
gas  and  pipeline  transportation can function  properly. The experience  of the  United
Kingdom shows that markets can be successfully created in almost all segments of the
natural  gas  industry,  as  long  as  the  design of  these  markets takes  into  account  the
economic and technical characteristics of the industry. These characteristics include the
multiproduct economies of scale that dominate pipeline transportation and the economies
of scope between natural gas supply and transportation.
As  the  industry  moves  away  from  a  vertically  integrated  structure,  appropriate
mechanisms to facilitate trading in gas markets and coordinate interactions between the
pipeline system operator and pipeline users must substitute for operations once performed
internally by the system operator. Such mechanisms support competition and efficiency
in the natural gas industry and help optimize gas flows and transportation costs in the
deintegrated  natural  gas  industry.  Once  these  mechanisms  are  in  place,  economic
regulation can focus on markets characterized by natural monopoly, such as the primary
market for pipeline capacity.
This paper shows how the U.K. government and industry participants have responded to
the  challenges created  by the opening  of the natural  gas  industry  to  competition.  It
concludes that the appropriate mechanisms for system operation and balancing and for
natural gas and capacity trading are already in place as a result of cooperation between
the government and industry participants.
The paper first describes the processes of the Network Code, a market-based method to
balance the pipeline system and optimize transportation by British Gas TransCo (BGT),
the transportation and storage arm of British Gas (the former publicly owned, monopoly
transporter and supplier of natural gas). It then analyzes the mechanisms used in physical
gas markets and presents an overview of developments in the financial gas market in the
U.K.. Next it describes pipeline capacity trading in primary and secondary markets and
the pricing of capacity and transportation services by BGT. Finally, it summarizes the
lessons from market development in the U.K. natural gas industry.
Pipeline System Operation
The  purpose  of  pipeline  system  operation  is  to  optimize  gas  flows  and  minimize
imbalances between gas intake and offtake. The main functions of system operation are:
*  Intake of gas of agreed volumes and quality at injection, or entry, points.
*  Transportation of gas through the pipeline system.
*  Offtake of gas of agreed volumes and quality at delivery, or exit, points.4
*  Maintenance of balance between intake and offtake.
*  Maintenance of a specific pressure.
*  Maintenance of a specific calorific value of gas.
These functions are carried out through the scheduling and central dispatch of gas flows.
Typically, a system operator schedules gas flows and balances the system according to
the supply and demand estimated on the day preceding the gas day. During the gas day
the operator relies on a central dispatch unit to respond to system imbalances by adjusting
pressure, rerouting gas flows, or curtailing intake or offtake in real time.
The industry structure determines the way in which the operator runs the system. In a
vertically integrated industry the operator optimizes gas flows and minimizes imbalances
internally. In a deintegrated industry it must coordinate these functions with other market
participants.  A set  of  rules  for  system  operation and  balancing is  important  in  both
industry configurations, but it is much more important in a deintegrated industry than in a
vertically  integrated  one.  If  there  are  a  large  number  of  pipeline  system  users,
coordination is required between them and the system operator, through  "rules of the
game"  that  determine  nomination  and  scheduling  of  gas  flows  and  balancing  and
operation of the system.
Costs in system operation
How  the  system  is  operated  affects  the  costs  faced  by  the  system  users  for  both
transportation  and  system  operation.  The  natural  monopoly  characteristics  of
transportation and the economies of scope between transportation and system operation
mean that costs can be minimized only if there is just one system operator. But the lack of
competition would mean that no market forces are acting as a check on prices, and an
unregulated system operator would typically charge monopoly prices for transportation
and system operation. Economic regulation of transportation services and capacity and a
transparent  set of rules for system operation help the regulator and users prevent such
exploitation  of  market  power  by the  system  operator  (for a  discussion  of  economic
regulation  of  transportation  services and  capacity see  the  section below  on  capacity
markets).
System balancing is a complex operation that imposes costs on the system users. If a
system user runs an imbalance, it imposes costs on the other users. The role of the system
operator is to discourage such behavior by reflecting these costs in balancing penalties.
But if the system runs an imbalance, the system operator implements balancing measures
that  impose costs on some or all users. The operator has much discretion in selecting
these measures. To ensure that the selection is based on the costs of the measures, explicit
rules  are needed for sequencing the measures according to  the  situation. In  addition,
mechanisms are needed to expose the system operator to the costs of system balancing.5
,One way  to  expose  the  system  operator  to  such  costs  is  through  the  pricing  of
transportation contracts. These contracts are priced according to the reliability of supply
provided by the system operator. Thus interruptible transportation contracts are sold at
lower  prices  than  firm  transportation  contracts,  because  interruptible  shipments  are
curtailed  first,  and  firm  shipments last,  in  the  event  of  a  system  imbalance.  Users
purchase the contracts that match their needs for reliability of supply, paying a premium
for more reliable transportation.
Another way to expose the system operator to the costs of balancing is by establishing a
spot  market  for imbalances  - the excess  or missing  gas in the  system.  The system
operator can use the price signals generated by a spot market to compare the costs of
system balancing measures with the cost of the gas needed to restore system balance, then
decide whether to purchase or sell the missing or excess gas in the spot market or to
curtail gas flows on the basis of the cost of each transaction. A spot market thus brings
market forces to bear on the system operator. In addition, it allows an effective penalty to
be imposed on users that cause a system imbalance, a penalty based on the spot price for
the missing or excess gas. This price which reflects the market value of the imbalance, is
an effective penalty because the price of a positive imbalance is typically lower than the
price the users paid in the gas market, and the price of a negative imbalance typically
higher.
System operation under the Network Code
The Network Code of British Gas TransCo is a set of rules for system balancing, capacity
acquisition and trading, and gas transportation and trading in the pipeline system operated
by BGT. ' And it is the legal document that forms the basis of the agreement between
BGT and shippers regarding the operation and use of the pipeline system.
The  Network  Code  facilitates cooperation among the  participants  in  the  unbundled,
deintegrated gas industry in the U.K., requiring each participant is required to perform
certain activities,  or  processes, that  in the end  lead to  optimal system  operation  and
balancing (for a description of the gas industry and its participants see box  I  and the
appendix). Because coordinating these processes requires the exchange of a large amount
of  data,  the  participants  communicate  with  one  another  through  the  U.K.  Link,  a
computer system developed by BGT.
' This section  draws  from BGT  1996.6
The Network Code processes are performed in four stages, according to  their position
relative to the gas day, the day when actual transportation of gas takes place (figure 1).
The gas day runs 24 hours, from 6:00 a.m. on the current day to 6:00 a.m. on the next
day.
Box 1: Participants in th0e  U.K NaturalGa  try
Delivery  y operators  dathi  rators  of the gas  si  ts  at entry terminals.
Public  gas transporter is,an  operator oftaission  p  e  r  a license  granted by
Ofgas. At present BGT and several small transmission companies have public gas transporter
licenses.
St:orage  amaagers  are the  rator  of s  g  ilities. At present. BGT is the onLy storage
manager linked to the Ipipeline  network.
Shippers  Arins  with  ashppesicensethatb  sm  erfs,  sell it to suppliers, andt
contract 4apblicgastanp4rfrtasottoofhestoosur.
S=ppliers al  ad  then sell  it to
consumers.  Spliers  d  '  c  gas  transporters.  Many
companies have both splesadsipr  iess
The Office of Gas Supply (Of  it  regulator of the  ral  gas indstry  in the'U.K..
Traders are firms that buy and sell natural gas in the spot makt  Traders do not deal directly
with pubicgas  transporters.orcustomers.
Allocation agents are the ad  nistratois  of the entry points in the pipeline system. These agents
act on behalf of shippers and calclate  how much of the gs  injected at a terminal belongs to
each shipper.  Then they infor  a  public gastraspor  w  ch  calculates the  transportation
~charges  forf  each siper
Shippers 'agents  aruthorzdtary  eon  behalfof  shippers.
Top-up manager is  a unit of BGT thate  sgs  is'stoe  tomeet  demand in the
event of severe weather duing  the following w  inter.
Shrinkage provider  is a unit ofBG that  isresponsible  for  robtaiing  the gas needed to fuel
compressors and balance any leakage in the pipeline system.
Source: BGT 1996.7
Figure 1 Network  Code Processes
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Stage I. Non-daily processes, pe7formed before the gCas  day
*  Shippers must obtain a shippers license from Ofgas and then establish a framework
agreement with BGT.
*  Shippers purchase pipeline or storage capacity, or both, from BGT (capacity booking)
or from  other shippers  in the  secondary capacity market  (capacity trading). BGT
charges shippers for booked capacity monthly.
*  Shippers register their customers and supply sites, or exit points, with BGT. Supply
sites can be daily metered or non-daily metered. Typically, contract market customers
have daily metered sites, and tariff market customers non-daily metered sites.
Stage 2: Processes performed oh the day before the gas day
*  In the gas nomination process shippers inform BGT about the location, quantity, and
calorific value of gas to be  injected into and withdrawn from the system on the gas
day (shippers can send their nomination up to one month in advance). Nomination
must be finalized by 12:00 p.m. for withdrawal at daily metered sites, by 2:30 p.m.
for use of storage, and by 3:00 p.m. for injection at the entry points. In the meantime
BGT forecasts withdrawal at non-daily metered sites for each  shipper and  creates8
non-daily  metered nominations  by 2:00  p.m..  All  shippers'  nominations  must  be
approved by BGT.
*  On the  basis  of the  approved nominations,  BGT  schedules the  gas flows  in  the
pipeline system to maintain safety and reliability of supply and to minimize costs. If
the system cannot transport all nominated gas, BC;T contacts shippers and asks for
revised nominations.
*  Renominations can be made between 6:00 p.m. on the day before the gas day and
3:59 a.m. on the current day.
*  Shippers able to adjust their supply and demand according to the expected system
price post their flexibility bids for selling or buying gas from BGT on the U.K. Link.
Flexibility bids become available to BGT at about 6:00 p.m. (see the section below on
the flexibility mechanism).
?  Shlippers  trade gas in the on-system market and include information about the trade in
their nominations or renominations (see the section below on on-system trading).
Stage 3: Processes performed during the gas day
3  BGT operates the network according to the schedule and responds to any problem in
the system through central dispatch of entry and exit ooints and the gas flows.
*  BGT monitors the system balance. If the system runs an imbalance, BGT buys or
sells the missing  or excess gas in  the flexibility  market. If it cannot eliminate an
imbalance through the flexibility mechanism, it uses available storage facilities or, in
serious cases, asks shippers to stop shipments to interruptible sites. 2 In an emergency
BGT issues flow orders 3.
*  Shippers are responsible for maintaining a balance between their intake and offtake
according to their nominations. If they run an imbalance, they can avoid penalties by
trading in the on-system market.
Stage 4: Processes performed on the day after the gas day
BGT collects data about the volume and calorific value of gas at entry and exit points
and  in  storage.  At  4:00  p.m.  metering  data  become  available  for  the  allocation
process.
2 BGT's choice  of interruptible  sites  must depend  entirely  on operational  necessity.  But  on average  over  the
year, all shippers  with interruptible  sites  must be treated  equally.
3 Flow  orders  are orders  issued  by pipeline  companies  that  require  shippers  to inject  or withdraw  natural
gas at a specific  point  to ensure  continued  flow of natural  gas through  the system  during  an emergency.9
*  The allocation  process  allocates the  gas  injected and  withdrawn  at  specific  sites
among the shippers. This task is performed by an allocation agent at entry points and
by' BGT  at daily  metered and non-daily  metered exit  sites  and  storage. Shippers
receive allocation data for review.
*  Each shipper's balance is calculated on the basis of the allocation data. 4 Shippers with
imbalances above a specified tolerance level are charged an imbalance penalty.  In
addition, they are charged or credited for gas that is above the tolerance level, at a
price equal to the last accepted flexibility bid in the flexibility market.
*  BGT uses the allocation data to calculate the commodity charges. It  adds to these
clharges capacity  overrun  penalties,  if  applicable,  and  credits  or  charges  for  the
flexibility bids accepted.
*  Finally, BGT produces a detailed monthly invoice for each shipper that includes all
applicable charges and credits and sends it to the shipper through the U.K. Link.
The final rule of the Network Code is that BGT cannot earn positive or negative profits
from maintaining system balance. So at the end of each month BGT sums up all receipts
and payments for the flexibility bids accepted and the imbalance and scheduling charges
and then credits or charges a share of the net sum to each shipper in proportion to the
amount of gas it shipped during that month.
4  Allocation data are finalized  within seven days after the gas day. If changes occur, the balance is
recalculated  and adjustment  is made in  the next invoice.10
Natural Gas Markets
The unbundling of gas supply and transportation and the opening of natural gas markets
to competition have created new requirements relating to how natural gas is traded and
how market participants interact. System operation rules guide the interactions between
gas shippers and the monopolistic gas transporter. But the industry structure and trading
mechanisms determine the efficiency of gas markets.
An efficient natural gas market performs three functions:
*  It aggregates supply and demand to determine system demand and supply curves.
*  It facilitates market clearing to determine the market price of natural gas.
*  It signals the market value of gas.
Market aggregation is achieved by concentrating trading among producers, traders, and
shippers at one or several trading points. These trading points can be market  centers,
typically located at the major pipeline interconnection or at the major entry point to the
high-pressure transmission system. In the U.K. the onshore terminals where producers
deliver their gas to BGT's pipeline network have become the trading points.
Market clearing is facilitated by trading mechanisms - bilateral trading, brokerage, spot
markets, and auctions. Which of these mechanisms is used depends on the characteristics
of supply and demand as reflected in the dimensions of gas contracts - typically time
and location of delivery, pressure and calorific value of gas, security of supply, and, of
course, the unit price of gas. Participants in the U.K. gas markets use all four trading
mechanisms.
Price  signaling is facilitated by the collection and  dissemination of information about
prices  and  trading  volumes  by  reporting  and  consulting  agencies,  journals,  and
newsletters.  The  reporting  of this  information enables  market participants  to  choose
trading and consumption strategies according to market signals. In the U.K. several firms
regularly  report spot market  prices  and volumes, including  PH  Energy Analysis  and
Argus  Petroleum.  At present there is no  statistical or panel reporting  of  spot market
prices.
Natural gas markets allow the trading of long-, medium-, and  short-term natural gas.
While  long-  and medium-term  gas  contracts  are more typical  for the  integrated  gas
industry, short-term gas contracts are important in the deintegrated gas industry because
of market participants' need to achieve physical balance between demand and supply in a
short time  frame (typically between one day and  one mronth). Thus system balancing
affects how natural gas is traded. In the U.K. the balancing requirements of the Network11
Code  have  led  to  two  forms  of  gas  trading:  on-system  trading  and  the  flexibility
mechanism.
Short-term gas trading is conducted using bilateral trading, brokerage, auction, and spot
market mechanisms.  Bilateral trading, typically in which  buyers and sellers negotiate
supply conditions on a bilateral basis, develops first. As the volume of trading increases,
bilateral trading becomes inefficient because markets become nontransparent and trading
imposes  high  transaction  costs  on  market  participants.  Bilateral  trading  is  therefore
replaced by brokerage.
Brokerage is an advanced bilateral trading model in which brokers, or traders, trade on
behalf of buyers and sellers. Brokers aggregate the demand and supply of their clients and
trade among themselves or with other market participants. As trading volume increases,
market participants need to concentrate trading at one or several trading points to reduce
transaction costs, and brokerage trading evolves into spot market trading.
The  development of  a  spot market  is typically followed by the  development  of risk
management instruments. Because spot market prices reflect system short-run marginal
costs  of  gas and  the opportunity costs  of capacity, they tend to  be  volatile,  and  the
inherent price risk is often very high for many market participants. This leads to demand
for risk  diversification and,  ultimately, to the  development of a  financial gas  market
where risk-minimizing financial instruments are traded. These markets can be organized
or not,  depending on  the ability of institutions to  respond to  market  needs. Initially,
financial institutions offered mostly swaps to customers on an individual basis. Trading
of standardized financial gas contracts in the U.K. started on January 31, 1997, when the
International Petroleum Exchange introduced natural gas futures contracts for delivery at
the National Balancing Point in BGT's pipeline system.
Auctioning is typically used for efficient trading of goods when one player dominates
supply or demand. In the U.K. natural gas industry, gas auctioning is conducted by BGT
in trading system imbalances. The trading rules are determined by the Network Code in
order to prevent abuse of BGT's monopoly in this market.
Physical gas market
Although British Gas has historically dominated the physical gas market, it has rapidly
been  losing market  share since deregulation of gas supply. In the  past five  years  its
monopoly has been eroded by competition in the contract market. Its  gas trading  and
supply arm, British Gas Energy (BGE), now has about a 33 percent share in that market,
but still has a monopoly in the tariff market (table 1; for a discussion of the distinction
between  contract  and  tariff  markets,  and  end-use  consumption  and  prices,  see  the
appendix). Taken together, these two positions give BGE about a 67 percent share in the
overall gas market in the U.K.. Although BGE faces competition from about 40 suppliers
in the contract market, its overall market share is unlikely to change substantially. On the12
other hand, it is estimated that it will lose about 25 percent of its tariff market share after
gas supply to the tariff market is opened to competition in 1998 (Royle 1996).
Table 1 Size of the U.K. Gas Market, 1994-95 (millions of therms)
BGE's share
Market  1994  1995  1995 (percent)
Tariff market  11,440  1 1,800  100
Contract market  10,780  11,200  33
Firm supply  5,720  5,900  15
Interruptible supply  3,300  3,300  50
Power generation supply  1,760  2,000  38
Total gas supply  22,220  23,000  67
Source: Royle 1996
The deregulation of retail markets, an open access policy, and the unbundling of British
Gas's  supply and transportation have led to the development of short-term gas trading.
Until recently most gas was sold under long- and medium-term contracts between British
Gas and producers or consumers. After deregulation market participants had to balance
their  supply and demand in the short term and thus needed an effective way to  trade
short-term gas. That led to the development of spot markets in entry terminals and  in
BGT's  pipeline system. At present, there are four mechanisms for trading natural gas in
the  U.K.:  bilateral  contracts,  spot  markets,  on-system  trading,  and  the  flexibility
mechanism (figure 2).13
Figure 2 Mechanisms for Natural Gas Trading
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Bilateral  contracts  between  producers  and shippers.
Spot  market  trading  among  producers,  traders,  and  shippers.
-~  >.-  On-system  trading  of  gas  and imbalances  between  shippers;  prior  notification  of  BGT  is required.
Flexibility  mechanism  - trading  between  shippers  and BGT.
Source: Authors  compilation
Bilateral  contracts
The traditional  way of trading  natural gas  in the U.K.  is  through bilateral  contracts,
medium- and long-term natural gas supply contracts, between producers and  shippers.
The provisions in  these contracts vary widely, depending on the characteristics of the
parties'  demand and supply. Parties typically specify the total volume of gas covered by
the contract; the unit price of the gas, which can be fixed or linked to the price of other
fuels (such as oil); and the financial settlement.
Long-term contracts specify delivery of gas for a period longer than one year, medium-
term contracts for a period between three months and one year. A typical example of a
long-term contract is a take-or-pay contract under which the buyer agrees to pay regularly
for a specified volume of gas regardless of whether it actually takes the entire amount.
The U.K. alternative to the take-or-pay contract is a depletion contract, under which the
buyer finances a share of the producer's  field development costs in exchange for future
gas deliveries.
Historically,  bilateral  supply  contracts  were  concluded  between  British  Gas  and  its
customers: British Gas acquired gas from producers at the onshore terminals and sold it14
to customers at consumption sites. But the opening of natural gas supply to competition
has multiplied  the contractual relations between producers and suppliers. As  more and
more  gas  has  become  available  for  independent  suppliers,  trading  has  gradually
concentrated where producers and suppliers have the best access to the gathering and
transmission pipeline systems. Bilateral supply contracts are now based on delivery at the
Bacton  and  St. Fergus  terminals. And  since the  introduction  of  the  Network  Code,
bilateral contracts with delivery at the national balancing point have developed (see the
section below on on-system trading).
The opening of natural  gas markets to  competition often involves transition  costs for
incumbent firms.  One example of such costs is the investment necessary to  fulfill the
regulator's  requirement to secure reliable supply for all consumers in the franchise area,
an  investment that  becomes useless  in a  competitive market. Another  is  the liability
arising  from  contracts  that  are  not  fulfilled  because  the  regulator  has  altered  the
contractual  relations.  A  regulator  might  allow  cancellation  of  long-term  contracts
between suppliers and consumers to promote development of a spot market, for example,
British Gas Energy will face such transition costs as a result of the deregulation of the
tariff market in 1998 (box 2).
Box  2 Transition  Costs of  Openin  iNatural  Gas to Comptition:  The. Case of British  Gas
Energy
Long-term  bilateral  contracts  oen  become  aburden  for  an  incumtbent supplier  after  the
opening of natural gas markets}  to competition.-  iTe  incumbent ofen  becomes stuck with take-
or-pay contracts concluded under an "obliigation-to-serv  regula  regime,  as many  of its
customers  switch&to competing  suppliers.,
British Gas Energy holds take-or-pay obligations tphase  about 4.6iion  cubic feet a day
(bcfd) of gas from producers, but it cai  sell onl  at  4.35bcfd  inconsumer  market. This
results  in  an  estimated  surplus  fdtof  tot  take-or-pay  ob  ns,
assuming that  BGf  maintains a  90pert  s  in  tr  n98.  TeBGE's
liability  from  this  surplus  amounfts t  bout  28%  milo  o  f  t  p  nlue  2
basis, assuming that BGE maintains a 90 percenh  in  1_ttatin  998.
Although BGE's  surplus is not a significant volume, it represents;  about 30 percent of recent
spot market volumes. So if BGE delivers its surplus-gas to spot markets, it will push down spot
market prices, enabling  BGE's  competition to  attract more customers  thrgh  lower prices.
Eventually, BGE may lose more than 10 percent ofits  marklet  e, whichVwould  increase its
take-or-pay liabilities.
Source.  Royle  1996.15
Spot market trading
Spot markets have developed at the onshore terminals of BGT's  pipeline network as a
result of the increasing need to balance supply and demand in the short term.' Four main
factors are behind the development of spot market trading in the U.K.:6
1.  Introduction  of  the  90:10  rule  in  1989.  This  rule  prohibits  British  Gas  from
purchasing more than 90 percent of the gas from any field. After it was introduced,
producers started to market their gas to independent gas suppliers, which competed
with British Gas in the contract market. Producers initially sold gas under medium- or
long-term contracts. But as changing demand and supply conditions led to a need to
balance gas requirements in the short term, they started selling gas on a short-term
basis.
2.  Ofgas order to British Gas to release gas to competitors in 1991. Between 1992 and
1995 British Gas made about 4.9 billion cubic meters of gas (this is total volume over
the whole period) available to competing suppliers through sale in spot markets.
3.  Oversupply by independent suppliers. Some suppliers committed themselves to  100
percent take-or-pay contracts but could not find customers for their gas. They took the
surplus gas to spot markets for resale.
4.  Delay in the start-up of three power stations. This delay led to an estimated demand
loss of 6.2 million cubic meters a  day, or 3 percent of the average daily  demand.
Stuck with the surplus gas, producers took it to spot markets.
Trading in a spot market is done on a bilateral basis, between producers and shippers, or
on a brokerage basis, with traders often acting as intermediaries. In the U.K. spot market
trading  started  as  a  bilateral  telephone  market  in  1989-90 between  producers  and
suppliers (Roeber 1996). The nature of the trading has not changed substantially except
for the entry of traders and the higher volumes of trading. Producers, shippers, and traders
"shop around," arranging for terms that best suit their needs.
Five types of natural gas contracts are traded in the U.K. spot markets:
*  Day-ahead gas - for delivery on the next day.
*  Balance gas - for delivery on a daily or weekly basis.
*  Monthly gas - for delivery during a specified calendar month.
' There are six entry terminals in the U.K., but only two of them, Bacton and St. Fergus, have developed
into major spot markets.
6 The data in this section are drawn from Royle 1996.16
*  Quarterly and annual gas - for delivery during a specified quarter or year.
*  Time  spread gas - for delivery against gas under contract for a  different time  of
delivery.
The products most commonly traded in the U.K. spot markets are day-ahead and monthly
gas contracts for delivery to the Bacton or St. Fergus terminals.
The U.K.  spot markets are still  generally thin, illiquid, and  volatile. Trading volume
ranges from 2 million to 8 million therms a day, 5 to 10 percent of the total daily supply.
Prices vary accordingly - ranging from 9 to 14 pence a therm (table 2 and figure 3)
Traded volumes and prices are reported by the media or specialized newsletters, such as
British Spot Gas Markets, published by PH Energy Analysis, and European Natural Gas
Daily, published by Petroleum Argus. British Spot Gas Markets introduced the Heren
Index, which  is  the weighted average price of  traded gas contracts  for  delivery in  a
particular month. The index, which is based on volume andl  price information collected
from traders, is an indicator of the market price of short-term,  gas and is increasingly used
as a price reference in bilateral contracts (Powel 1996).
Table 2 Spot Market Prices and Volumes at the Bacton Tterminal,  June-July 1996
Indicator  June 1996  July 1996
Heren Index (pence per thern)  12.1275  9.6546
Number of transactions  38  35
Total volume (millions of therms  2.278  2.072
per day)
Lowest price (pence per therm)  10.50  9.00
Highest price (pence per therm)  13.575  11.5
Smallest volume (therms per day)  18,000  15,000
Largest volume (therms per day)  250,000  300,000
Source: The Heren Index, July 1996
The most important issue in the further development of spolt markets in the U.K. is the
need for a standardized gas contract. An efficient short-termn  market should facilitate the
pricing of gas according to the system short-run marginal cost of gas. A short-term gas
contract has fewer parameters than a long-term gas contract, which includes a number of
delivery characteristics in addition to price. A standardized short-term contract specifying
a delivery to  a major terminal  or an interconnection in  the pipeline system therefore
improves the efficiency of trading short-term gas. The introduction of the "on-system"
market at the National Balancing Point in BGT's  pipeline system provides  a "system-
wide"  trading point for such a  contract. This is complemented by the activities of the
International Petroleum  Exchange (IPE) to  launch the trading of standardized physical
and financial gas contracts at the National Balancing Point. The IPE has succeeded in17
developing a commercially viable natural gas futures contract, but the development of a
short-term gas contract has been postponed due to communication problems between the
IPE and BGT.
Figure 3 Argus Monthly Sell-Buy Index, October 1995-September
1996
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Source:  Petroleum  Argus  data18
On-system trading
The on-system  trading  is basically trading  in  a  spot market  located at  an  imaginary
notional point in the pipeline system. Shippers use their reserved pipeline capacity to
deliver natural gas to the notional point where they sell it to interested buyers. Buying
shippers then use their pipeline capacity to transport natural gas from the notional point to
a desired location. The pipeline system operator, which keeps track on traded volumes
and provides transportation services, facilitates completion of transactions.
The  on-system  market  in  the  U.K.  facilitates trading  of  natural  gas  at the National
Balancing  Point  (NBP),  a  notional  point  in  BGT's  pipeline  network  at  which  BGT
balances its high pressure pipeline system. Transactions typically involve shippers which
own entry and exit pipeline capacity, and are facilitated by BGT's  nomination process
under the Network Code. A shipper with entry capacity to the NBP sells natural gas to a
shipper with exit capacity from the NBP. After the two shippers agree on the conditions
of trade, they nominate their gas flows, specifying the other party as the exit and entry
poinlt. If the two nominations match in BGT's  system schedule, BGT approves the trade
and the transaction can be completed.
Physical and financial flows of a transaction in the on-systenm  market are different. The
gas withdrawn from BGT's system by the buying shipper is often different from the gas
injected  by  the  selling  shipper,  because  BGT  directs  gas  flows  subject  to  system
optimization and does not follow contractual links. The only requirement for BGT is that
it deliver the same quantity  and  quality of  gas nominated by  the contractual parties.
Financial  settlement  of  the  transaction  involves  only  the  shippers;  BGT  does  not
participate.
The on-system market has become popular among gas traders in the U.K. because of its
central  location,  accessibility,  and  low  transaction  costs.  The  on-system  trading  is
becoming  increasingly robust and liquid,  as the liberalization of the U.K.  gas market
advances.  Shippers use the on-system market to trade  a whole  variety of natural  gas
contracts, which are much the same as those traded in a spot market:
*  Day-ahead gas is a common product in all spot markets. The delivery period is the
next  gas  day; and the  gas  is used  for daily balancing  and price  arbitrage. In  an
example of a day-ahead gas trade, on September 24, 1996, 25,000 therms of gas for
delivery on the next gas day  (between 6:00 a.m. Septemnber  25  and  6:00 a.m. of
September 26) were sold for 13.1 pence per therm (see line '3 of table 3).
*  Balance gas restores the shipper's balance between supply and demand in a particular
period. The delivery period ranges from one day to one  month, depending on  the
shipper's  needs. In  an example of a balance gas trade, on  July  25,  1996, 50,000
therms a day of balance gas for delivery over the remaining days of July were sold for
13 pence per therm (see line 5 of table 3).19
*  Short- and medium-term gas is sold or resold to suppliers, with the period of delivery
ranging  from one month to one year. In one such transaction 100,000 therms a day of
short-term gas were traded on July 25, 1996, for delivery in October 1996 (see line 6
of table 3). Similarly, two blocks of 25 therms a day of medium-term gas were traded
on July 24, one for delivery in the fourth quarter of 1996 and the other for delivery in
the 12 months starting October 1996 (see lines 3 and 4).
*  Time spread gas represents an  exchange of gas  contracts with  different times  of
delivery.  Shippers settle the price difference on the basis of their projection of the
price of the gas. On July 26, 1996, shippers exchanged two gas contracts for delivery
of 25,000 therms a day of gas in August and October (see line 8 of table 3). They
agreed that  the price of the contracts was identical,  based  on the prevailing  spot
market prices.
Table 3 On-System Trading, July 22-28, 1996
Volume  Price
Day of trade  Period of delivery  (thousands of therms a day)  (pence per therm)
I  July 22  Sept. 1-30  25  12.95
2  July23  Aug. 1-31  25  13.15
3  July 24  Fourth quarter, 1996  25  13.525
4  July 24  Oct. 1996-Sept. 1997  25  12.95
5  July 25  July balance  50  13.00
6  July25  Oct. 1-31  100  13.20
7  July 26  Aug. 1-31  25  13.30
8  July 26  Time spread  25  no price
Aug. vs. Oct.  difference
9  September  Day ahead  25  13.1
24
Source: PH  Energy Analysis, British Spot  Gas Markets,  Petroleum Argus,  European
Natural Gas Daily.
The  flexibility  mechanism
The flexibility mechanism provides a framework for trading gas imbalances in BGT's
pipeline network. Its primary purpose is to eliminate system imbalances caused by the
deviation of shippers'  gas injections and withdrawals from the approved schedule. BGT
uses an auction mechanism to buy gas from or sell it to shippers in order to restore system
balance.  The flexibility  mechanism thus effectively  establishes a  spot  market  - the
flexibility market - that is much like the on-system market, except that trading takes
place between BGT and shippers rather than among the shippers. Shippers bid volumes
and prices, and BGT selects the bids that minimize the cost of restoring system balance.
Ideally, competition among shippers should lead to bids that reveal the true system short-20
run marginal cost of gas, so that the price of gas in the flexibility market reflects the true
market value of gas.
Transactions  in  the flexibility  market  are carried  out through  an  auction  because of
BGT's  monopoly or monopsony position as a  seller or  buyer of  gas. The auction  is
guided by the Network Code and Ofgas. BGT operates the system on a nonprofit basis
and so does not directly benefit from transactions in the flexibility market. Its incentive is
thus to restore system balance rather than to speculate in the flexibility market.
Operation of the flexibility mechanism The flexibility mechanism operates as follows:7
*  Shippers decide to sell gas to or buy it from BGT, depending on their estimates of
system  supply  and  demand and  the price  of  gas. 8 If a  shipper  expects a  system
imbalance on the next gas day and has some flexibility in adjusting its own portfolio
of supply and demand contracts, it posts a flexibility bid on the electronic network. A
flexibility bid can be for a "system sell" or a "system buy," depending on the kind of
system  balance expected.  (The  transactions  in  the  flexibility  market  are  always
considered from the point of view of the system.). A typical flexibility bid specifies
the type of bid,  the date, the quantity and  calorific value  of gas, the injection  or
withdrawal points, the duration of the implementation of the offer, and the price per
kilowatt-hour. Shippers can offer alternatives to their bid or withdraw it at any time
except when the bid is being evaluated or after it has been accepted. Shippers can also
see other bids but not who posted them.
X  The list of bids becomes available to BGT at 6:00 p.m. on the day preceding the gas
day. If a system imbalance occurs, BGT accepts the best bid, typically the one with
the best price. (Other parameters considered are time, location of injection and entry
points, and duration of implementation of the offer relative to the same parameters of
the  system  imbalance.)  That means that  BGT  accepts  the  lowest-price bid  for  a
system buy and the highest-price bid for a system sell.  The price of the last accepted
bid becomes the  system marginal price. BGT then notifies the  successful bidders,
who must implement the offers. If shippers fail to comply, they incur scheduling and
imbalance penalties. All unaccepted flexibility bids become redundant at 4:00 a.m. on
the current day.  Transactions in the  flexibility market are settled  in  a  subsequent
monthly invoice.
The flexibility mechanism was introduced as part of the Network Code in April  1996.
The Network Code requires all shippers to keep a  daily balance between injected and
withdrawn gas within a certain tolerance. If shippers exceed their daily balance, they are
7 This discussion of the flexibility's mechanism's operation draws from EIGT  1996.
Changes in supply and demand cause changes in the injections and withdrawals of individual shippers,
resulting in system imbalance and action by BGT in the flexibility market.  If the system runs a positive
imbalance, BGT must sell the extra gas - a "system sell" - to restore system balance. If the system runs a
negative imbalance, BGT must purchase the missing gas - a "system buy." The price for a system sell is
lower than the prevailing spot market price, while the price for a system buy is higher.21
charged an imbalance penalty. In addition, they receive credit or are charged for the gas
withdrawn or injected in excess of the tolerance. A unit price of this gas is equal to the
system marginal price.
The transition  from  monthly to  daily  balancing imposed substantial  requirements  on
shippers. To phase  in this  change, the Network Code operated under a  "soft landing"
regime between April and September 1996. This regime allowed shippers to exceed their
daily balance by 100 percent of the daily average of their deliveries and offlakes during
the previous 30 days. The daily imbalance outside this tolerance was cashed out at the
system marginal price. At the end of the month, if the monthly imbalance (the cumulative
daily imbalances) did not exceed three times the tolerance level, it was cashed out at the
system average price, equal to the average price of all accepted flexibility bids during the
last 30 days. If the monthly imbalance was above the tolerance, the imbalance was cashed
out at the system marginal price (figure 4).
Figure 4 Balancing under the Soft Landing Regime of the Network Code
Daily imbalance tolerance  Monthly imbalance
Daily Imbalance
Monthly imbalance tolerance)
Days in month  End of the
month
Source:  Gas  Matters,  March  1996
Note: The daily imbalance is equal to the difference between offlakes and deliveries on
the gas day. It is cashed out at the system marginal price if it exceeds daily imbalance
tolerance;  otherwise it is cashed out at the system average price. The daily imbalance
tolerance  is based on the average of the last 30 days of  deliveries and  offtakes. The
monthly imbalance is equal to the cumulative daily imbalance at the end of the month. It
is cashed out at the system marginal price if it exceeds the monthly imbalance tolerance;
otherwise it is cashed out at the system average price. The monthly imbalance tolerance is
equal to three times the daily imbalance tolerance.22
Evaluation of the flexibility  mechanism The flexibility mechanism facilitates real-time,
market-based reactions by the system operator to a system imbalance. BGT's  ability to
monitor the system and quickly identify the source, size, and location of an imbalance at
any  given moment  allows  it to  determine an  appropriate response.  The price  signals
generated by the flexibility market indicate the cost-minimizing way to restore system
balance. Based  on the cost of gas as revealed by the flexibility bids, BGT can decide
whether  to  use  the  flexibility  mechanism  to  restore  balance or  to  curtail  shipments
instead.
The flexibility mechanism effectively imitates a spot market in order to facilitate trading
of day and swing gas' in form of gas balances. Such gas is often lacking in spot markets,
where the typical product is month gas. Trading in the flexibility market occurs only if
the system is in an imbalance caused by the imbalances of individual shippers. These
individual imbalances are caused by a change in supply or demand that induces a shipper
to alter its injection and withdrawal schedule from the nominated one. At the same time,
the change in supply or demand causes the market value of gas to deviate from the spot
market price. BGT uses the flexibility mechanism to restore system balance and discover
the actual market value of gas. Flexibility bids reveal the system short-run marginal cost
of gas, and the market value of gas is equal to the system marginal price determined in an
auction.
Shippers are willing to sell gas to the system only if the market value of gas is above the
spot  market  price  and  to  buy  gas  only  if  the  market  value  is  below  that  price.
Consequently, shippers with imbalances realize the market price for the gas that is above
the tolerance level. The system marginal price for a system sell therefore should be below
the spot market price, while that for a system buy should be above the spot market price.
This gives a premium to selling or buying shippers and imposes a penalty on shippers
with imbalances. An overview of price determination in the flexibility market is given in
figures 5 and 6.
Swing gas is very-short term gas delivered on an hourly basis.23
Figure  5 Price  Determination  in the Flexibility  Market  with  the
Source  of Imbalance  a Change  in Demand  SRMC
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SRMC  System short-run marginal cost of gas.
Situation on the day before the gas day
PS.  Spot market price of gas with delivery on the gas day (day-ahead gas.)
Q 1 io QWO  The quantity of gas nominated for injection into and withdrawal from
BGT's pipeline system according to the approved schedule for the gas day.
The system must be in balance: Qlo=Qwo.
I-IV, 1-6  Flexibility bids for a system sell and a systera buy.
Situation on the gas day
Case 1: Positive system imbalance - system sell
QWI<QWO  The quantity of gas withdrawn from the system is below the nominated
quantity because of an unexpected decrease in the demand for gas.
Shippers are unable to react in real time, so the quantity of gas injected
into the system is equal to the nominated quentity (Qil=Qi.).
Qil Qwl  The difference between the quantities of injected and withdrawn gas is
equal to the size of the system imbalance, which is positive because
Qi,>Qw,. BGT must sell the excess gas in the flexibility market to restore
system balance. BGT accepts flexibility bids I-III.
SMPSe.I  The system marginal price of gas sold by BGrT  to winning bidders. It is
equal to the price of the last accepted flexibility bid.
Case 2: Negative system imbalance - system buy
QW2>QWO  The quantity of gas withdrawn from the system is above the nominated
quantity because of an unexpected increase in demand for gas. Shippers
are unable to react in real time, so the quantity of gas that is injected into
the system is equal to the nominated quantity (Q0 2=Q 1
0 ).
Qi 2 .QW2 The difference between the quantities of injected and withdrawn gas is
equal to the size of the system imbalance, which is negative because
Q1 2 <QW 2 . BGT must buy the missing gas in the flexibility market to
restore system balance. BGT accepts flexibillity  bids 1-4.
SMPbLIy  The system marginal price of gas bought by ]BGT  from winning bidders. It
is equal to the price of the last accepted flexibility bid.25
Figure  6  Price Determination  in the  Flexibility  Market  with  the Source  of  Imbalance  a
Change  in Supply
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Situation  on the day before  the gas day
SRMCO  System  short-run  marginal  cost of gas.
Ps.  Spot market  price of gas with delivery  on the gas day (day-ahead  gas).
QiQ,QWO  The quantity  of  gas nominated for injection  into and  withdrawal  from
BGT's pipeline  system  according  to the approved  schedule  for the gas day.
The system must be in balance: Qi,=QWu.
I-V, 1-4  Flexibility  bids for a system  sell and a system  buy.
Situation  on the gas day
Case 1: Positive system imbalance - system sell
SRMC  The SRMC shifts  outward  because  of a positive gas supp'y shock.
Qil>Qio  The quantity of  gas injected into the system is  above the nominated
quantity because of  an  unexpected increase in  the  supply  of  gas.
Consumers  are unable  to change  consumption  in real time, so the quantity
of gas withdrawn from the system is equal to  the nominated quantity
(QWl=QW.).
Qil Qw 1 The difference between the quantities of injected and withdrawn gas is
equal  to the size of the system  imbalance,  which is possible  because
Qil>QW,.  BGT must sell the excess gas in the flexibility  market to restore
system  balance.  BGT accepts  flexibility  bids I-IV.
SMPSeII  The system marginal  price of gas sold by BGT to winning bidders. It is
equal to the price of the last accepted  flexibility  bid.
Case 2: Negative system imbalance - system buy
SRMC 2 The system  SRMC shifts  upward  because  of a negative  gas supply  shock.
QV2<Qi 0 The quantity of gas injected into the system is below the nominated
quantity because of  an  unexpected decrease in  the  supply of  gas.
Consumers  are unable  to change  consumption  in real time, so the quantity
of gas withdrawn from the system is equal to the nominated quantity
(QW 2=QW.).
Qi2 QW 2 The difference  between the quantities  of injected and withdrawn  gas is
equal to the size of the system imbalance, which is negative because27
QiZ<QW2  BGT  must  buy  the  missing gas  in  the flexibility  market  to
restore system balance. BGT accepts flexibility bids 1-3.
SMPbuy,  The system marginal price of gas bought by BGT from winning bidders. It
is equal to the price of the last accepted flexibility bid.
Data  for  July  1996  support the  relation  between  flexibility  and  spot  market  prices
predicted above, although the period is short (table 4). During 10 days of that month BGT
sold gas at a system marginal price below the prevailing spot market price and bought gas
at a system marginal price above the spot market price. The system average price was
close to the system marginal price on all but one day of trade, reflecting the small spread
of prices in flexibility bids. The exception was July 28, when the system average price
exceeded the spot market price even though the system was selling. This exception was
caused by the high price of £3.11 per therm for 170,847 therms sold to National Power,
compared with the prevailing system marginal price for system sell of 10.07 pence per
therm.  According to British Spot Gas Markets (July 29,  1996), the trader for National
Power who placed this expensive bid had confused therms with kilowatt-hours.
Table 4 Trading and Prices in the Flexibility Market, July 19-28, 1996
(1 pence per them, unless otherwise indicated)
Volume  a  SAP  Spot market
Dav  (millions of therms)  SAP  SMP buy  SMP sell  30-day  price
19  -2.56  15.04  15.05  8.90  12.45  12.1275
20  2.81  11.72  34.87  11.71  12.56  12.1275
21  0  12.49  35.58  8.99  12.49  12.1275
22  2.00  10.88  35.31  10.24  12.51  12.1275
23  0  12.47  35.03  9.04  12.47  12.1275
24  0  12.49  34.74  9.04  12.49  12.1275
25  0  12.58  34.44  9.01  12.58  12.1275
26  0  12.59  34.12  9.02  12.59  12.1275
27  3.79  10.72  33.78  10.54  12.61  12.1275
28  2.67  32.28  33.44  10.07  12.56  12.1275
Note: SAP is system average price; SMP is system marginal price. Numbers in bold are
the system average or marginal price of accepted flexibility bids, and numbers in italics
the system average or marginal price of nonaccepted bids.
Note: The spot market price is approximated by the Heren Index, as calculated by PH
Energy Analysis for July 1996 for the Bacton terminal.
a. A positive number indicates a system sell, a negative number a system buy.
Source: The Heren Index, July 199628
Financial gas market
The financial gas market in the U.K. came to existence relatively  recently, but it has
already experienced major developments. Initially, financial gas instruments were traded
mostly  by  financial and  trading  institutions,  which  offeredl customized  financial  gas
contracts  to  large  customers,  shippers  or  suppliers.  The  financial  gas  market  was
relatively unorganized and small, as only few instruments were traded"'. An increase in
the volumes of natural gas traded in the spot market and corresponding volatility of spot
prices have initiated demand for more financial instruments designed to hedge price risks.
The  International  Petroleum Exchange  in  London carried  out  the task  of  developing
standardized  financial  gas  contracts.  Originally,  the  IPE  intended  to  develop  both
physical and financial gas contracts for delivery to the Bacton terminal, but because of
the increasing use and great potential of the on-system market, the delivery  point has
been changed to the National Balance Point. After complicated negotiations with BGT
and OFGAS over an access to BGT's electronic network", the IPE finally introduced its
Natural Gas NBP contract on January 31, 1997, as the first gas futures contract in Europe.
This marked a start of trading of standardized financial gas contracts in the U.K.
A single IPE Natural Gas NBP contract is for delivery of 1,000 therms of natural gas per
day at the NBP' 2. Trading takes place in multiples of 5,000 therms per day through the
IPE automated Energy Trading System or in the over-the-counter market. Contracts can
be traded in groups of individual days on a monthly basis up to 12 months into the future.
The IPE has also introduced a Balance of the Month contract which for delivery in all
days remaining in the current month. If delivery is to occur, traders are required to follow
BGT's  nominations process and coordinate with the London  Clearing House to  fulfill
their obligations.
The IPE natural gas futures contract has become increasingly popular among gas traders
in the U.K. It was widely accepted by the gas industry because of its central delivery
location and smooth administration. For exarnple, total volume of traded gas on July 31,
1997.  was  almost  30  million  therms,  representing  about  40%  of  total  U.K.  daily
production of natural gas (IPE 1  997b). The IPE also facilitates trading of the Exchange of
Futures  for  Physicals,  a  popular  contract that  allows  traders  to  liquidate  equal  and
opposite physical and financial positions in natural gas, and intends to introduce a natural
gas options contract. Although some say that the sole U.K. natural gas market may not be
large enough to allow efficient trading of natural gas futures contracts, the success of the
"There have been only 1O  to 15 swap transactions so far, according to Colin Bryce of Morgan Stanley
International in London.
" For more details on IPE's activities in preparation of natural gas physical and financial contracts, see
European Natural Gas Daily, September 23, 1996, published by Petroleum Argus Ltd., London..
12 This paragraph draws on (IPE 1997a).29
IPE Natural Gas NBP contract has disproved these predictions. The IPE eyes gas markets
in continental Europe, which may provide a number of opportunities for financial gas
trading once they are liberalized.
Capacity Markets
Capacity  markets  enable  industry  participants to  purchase the  pipeline  capacity  and
transportation services needed to transport gas from the point of purchase to the point of
consumption. A primary capacity market is supplied by the pipeline operators, which sell
their capacity and transportation services to shippers. Revenues from the primary capacity
market should recover the operator's costs of constructing the pipeline and transporting
the gas. Therefore, the price for capacity (the capacity charge) should generate enough
revenues  to  recover  the  fixed  costs,  and  the  price  for  transportation  services  (the
commodity charge) the variable costs, of the pipeline operator.
A secondary capacity market increases the efficiency of the pipeline system.  Shippers
with  temporarily spare capacity can resell it to market participants lacking capacity. If
demand for capacity can be met by existing capacity offered in the primary and secondary
markets, the pipeline operator need not install new pipelines. Selling shippers use the
revenues from resold capacity to offset the costs of capacity purchased in the primary
market.  Buying  shippers  can decide  whether to  purchase  capacity in  the primary  or
secondary  market,  depending  on  the  prices.  An  efficient  price  for  capacity  in  the
secondary market should reflect the opportunity costs of capacity, which vary according
to the degree of congestion in the pipeline system.
Capacity markets in the U.K.  are framed along BGT's  pipeline and  storage network.
Shippers  must  purchase  pipeline  capacity  either  from  BGT  in  the  primary  market
(capacity  booking)  or  from  shippers  with  spare  capacity  in  the  secondary  market
(capacity trading). Capacity booking is typically performed by signing a 12-month firm
transportation contract with BGT. Capacity trading is done through  the auctioning of
spare capacity or bilateral trading between two shippers (figure 7).30
Figure 7 Pipeline Capacity Booking and Trading
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@  Shippers  book  capacity  from  British  Gas  TransCo  on all three  levels  (typically  a 12-month  contract).
Shippers  trade  free  capacity  and notify  British  Gas  TransCo  of the new  capacity  owner.
Shippers  settle  the  trade  financially.
Note: NTS is national transmission system; LDZ is local distribution zone.
Source: Author's compilation
Primary capacity market
In the U.K. primary capacity market shippers typically book capacity under a 12-month
contract with BGT at three locations:
*  At an entry point to the national transmission system (NTS)  - NTS entry capacity.
*  At an exit point from the national transmission system - NTS exit capacity.
*  At an exit point from the local distribution zone (LDZ) - LDZ capacity.
In  addition,  shippers  can  book  storage  capacity,  consisting  of  storage  space  and
deliverability (a rate of gas withdrawal from storage).31
BGT  provides  transportation services for  shippers under  contracts  for  either  firm  or
interruptible transportation. Firm customers must pay all relevant capacity charges as well
as a commodity charge. Interruptible customers pay an NTS entry capacity charge and a
commodity  charge.  Interruptible transportation is  available only  for  transportation of
more than 200,000 therms a year, and it can be interrupted for up to 45 days each year. In
addition,  BGT offers nominated interruptible transportation that  can be interrupted for
more than 45 days a year. Customers using this service pay an NTS entry capacity charge
as well as discounted NTS and LDZ commodity charges.
Because BGT has a monopoly position in gas transportation in the U.K.,  its rates for
capacity and transportation services are regulated by Ofgas, under a mix of rate-of-return
and  price  cap  regulatory  methods.  Rates  are  first  calculated  to  ensure  that  BGT's
revenues from transportation cover its total costs and provide a return on capital. They are
then subject to a price cap, which limits growth in revenues and allows for productivity
improvements over a certain period. When the price cap expires, Ofgas reviews BGT's
revenues, costs, and asset value and, based on its findings, sets a  new price cap with
necessary adjustments. The rate structure is determined by BGT, although Ofgas closely
monitors  the structure and approves any changes. Ofgas's  aim is to  support long-run
efficiency in the primary capacity market and transportation. The underlying objectives
are  therefore  to  protect  consumers  from  BGT's  market  power  and  allow  BGT's
shareholders to earn a fair rate of return.
BGT's rate structure for transportation and capacity is gradually being revised to better
reflect the true costs of these services.1 3 The current rate structure, which came into effect
in October 1994, introduced locational pricing for capacity and a 50/50 split of revenues
between capacity and commodity charges. It was preceded by a rate structure built around
distance-based transportation charges and the same 50/50  split between  capacity  and
commodity charges. The goal of BGT and Ofgas is to provide market participants with
the right signals about the efficient location of sites and the size of consumption. Despite
substantial  improvement  in the  efficiency of rates, Ofgas is  pushing  BGT to  reduce
commodity charges in order to achieve a 90/10 split between capacity and commodity
charges. This  rate  structure  should better  reflect the ratio  between BGT's  fixed  and
variable costs.
The pricing of NTS capacity is based on the long-run marginal cost of capacity. Capacity
charges are determined for each NTS entry point and about 80 NTS exit points, which are
structured into 34 zones. A charge for each point is determined by an approximation of a
matrix of the long-run marginal costs of the capacity needed to meet the incremental
deman-d  for transportation from a particular point to all exit zones. BGT, in cooperation
with  Ofgas, has decided to use long-run marginal cost pricing of capacity rather than
short-run marginal cost pricing, which would lead to high price volatility. Although long-
run marginal cost pricing  does not achieve the same allocative efficiency as short-run
" This  section  is based  on Higson  1996.32
marginal cost pricing does, it should give market participants more certainty in their
investment decisions.  In addition, an active secondary  market with short-term  capacity
should facilitate  efficient allocation  of capacity in the short term, so that the allocative
inefficiencies  of long-run  marginal  cost pricing  should  be limited.
NTS capacity  charges, based  on the long-run  marginal cost of capacity,  recover only 55
percent of fixed costs, or 50 percent of the total costs of transportation.  BGT has decided
to recover the rest through  NTS commodity  charges, despite Ofgas's opposition. As a
result, NTS  commodity charges have been derived from the remaining  50 percent  of
BGT s total  costs of  running  the national transmission system,  rather  than from  the
variable costs of transportation, which represent about 10 percent of the total costs. The
adopted  principle  of  a  50/50  split  between  capacity  and  commodity  charges  has
suppressed  the  consumption  of  transportation  services,  especially  of  interruptible
transportation, because users face inefficiently high costs in traLnsporting  their gas through
the system. In addition, the NTS commodity charge is "postalized"  - set at the same
level  for  the  entire  national  transmission  system  - ignoring  any  differences  in
transportation  costs among  regions.
LDZ capacity and commodity charges are based on the principle that the size of a user's
peak daily capacity determines the fixed and variable costs that the user imposes on the
pipeline system. Shippers with low peak daily capacity pay higher rates than shippers
with high peak daily capacity. The rationale for this is that a. shipper with higher peak
daily capacity uses a higher-pressure tier of the pipeline system and higher volumes of
gas, resulting in lower per-unit costs for capacity and transportation. Both LDZ capacity
and commodity charges are postalized for all LDZs. This creates inefficiency, because
users do not face the true costs of capacity and transportation.
BGT and Ofgas continue to enhance the rate structure. One of the most important tasks
for BGT with regard to the gradual opening of the tariff market is to establish a separate
rate structure for transportation to tariff market customers. Other tasks include changing
the  split between capacity and commodity charges from  50/50 to  90/10 and  deriving
zone-specific LDZ capacity and commodity charges.
Secondary capacity market
Any combination of NTS entry and exit point capacity or LDZ exit point capacity that is
held by a shipper is eligible for resale in the secondary capacily market except for LDZ
exit capacity at a non-daily metered site. The secondary capacity market experiences little
activity, however, because of its  short existence and the abundance of capacity in the
primary market.
There are two mechanisms for capacity trading in the secondary market: bilateral trading
and auction (both mechanisms are also used in the capacity release program in the U.S.
natural gas industry). Bilateral capacity trading takes place when two shippers directly
agree on the conditions of trade. After the deal is concluded, the selling shipper records33
its offer for sale of capacity along with the name of the buying shipper on the electronic
network.  The buying  shipper approves this  transaction by  confirming  the trade.  The
selling shipper must notify BGT of the capacity trade to make a change in allocation. It
also remains  responsible for payment of capacity charges to BGT.
The auctioning of capacity, which takes place through the electronic network, has five
stages (figure 8). '
*  A shipper with spare capacity posts a capacity offer specifying the quantity, location,
duration, and suggested price of capacity.
*  Shippers seeking capacity can view available bids in the network and post their bids
for part or all of the offered capacity. They can also view the bids already posted, but
not the names of shippers. Once a bid is posted, it cannot be amended, but it can be
withdrawn. Shippers can post more than one bid against an offer.
*  The selling shipper reviews the posted bids and selects one of them.
*  The selling shipper notifies BGT of the new owner of the capacity. Payment of the
capacity charge remains the responsibility of the selling shipper.
*  The selling and buying shippers settle the trade financially. BGT does not participate
in the financial settlement.
4 This  description  of capacity  auctioning  is based  on  BGT  1996.34
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The  price  of  capacity  in  an  efficient  secondary market  reflects  the  SRMC  and  the
opportunity costs of capacity. It is high during peak periods when the pipeline system is
congested and the opportunity costs of capacity are high. On the other hand, the price of
capacity is low during off-peak periods when the system has plenty of unused capacity
and the opportunity costs of capacity are equal or close to zero.
Under the existing institutional arrangements, the secondary capacity trading in the U.K.
is  being developed mainly  along the  natural  gas trading  in  the "on-system"  market.
Increasing liquidity of the "on system" gas market and uniformity of electronic systems
make gas and capacity transactions at the NBP a viable option for shippers to match their
gas and capacity needs on daily, monthly or even longer-term bases. As a result shippers
increasingly trade secondary pipeline capacity, particularly in the short-term, although it
may often be "bundled" with natural gas traded at the NBP.35
Conclusion
The U.K. experience in natural gas markets shows that the transition from a monopolized
to  a  competitive  natural  gas  industry  must  be  accompanied  by  the  creation  of  an
appropriate regulatory and institutional framework that shields entrants from the exercise
of market power by the incumbent and gives participants in the gas market equal rights in
dealing with the transmission monopolist.
A key part of this framework in the U.K. natural gas industry is the Network Code, a
mechanism for optimizing gas transportation and system balancing in the decentralized
gas industry. The code is a set of rules that determine how the pipeline system users
cooperate with  the  system  operator when  seeking transportation  services. They  also
determiiine  how  the system will  be operated  and the system  balance maintained.  The
operator uses price  signals generated through the flexibility mechanism to  choose the
balancing measures with the lowest cost to society.
Physical natural  gas  is traded  under  four  mechanisms. Long-  and  medium-term  gas
contracts are traded in a bilateral contract market. Short-term gas is traded in spot markets
that  have been developed at the entry points  to  the pipeline  network. The other two
mechanlisms, used for  gas trading in the pipeline network, imitate  a  systemwide spot
market. The flexibility mechanism facilitates the trading of short-term and very  short-
term (swing) gas through an auction, and the on-system market provides an opportunity
to trade medium- and short-term gas and imbalances.
Pipeline  capacity  and  transportation  services  are  sold  in  a  primary  market  at
preannounced rates that are regulated because of the natural monopoly characteristics of
gas transportation in the pipeline network. A secondary market facilitates capacity trading
by auction or through bilateral dealing at deregulated rates.
Bv contrast to the physical gas market, the financial gas market in the United Kingdom is
underdeveloped. Only limited price risk hedging is provided by financial intermediaries,
on a case-by-case basis. Other financial instruments, such as futures or options contracts,
are unavailable  but  are being  developed. The underdevelopment of the  financial  gas
contract market is attributable to the brief existence of the short-term physical gas market.
Increasing use of spot markets can be expected to increase the demand for risk hedging
instruments.
The most important issue today is whether industry participants can reach a consensus on
how  to  enhance  the  existing  framework  to  improve  the  efficiency  of  markets.
Development of the financial gas market  will require cooperation between  BGT  and
Ofgas  to  provide  the  International Petroleum  Exchange  access  to  BGT's  electronic
network so that it can record and settle transactions. And both BGT and its customers will
need  to  contribute time  and  resources to  developing  an  efficient  tariff  structure  for
pipeline capacity and transportation services in the contract and tariff markets.36
The deintegrated natural gas industry in the United Kingdom is off to a promising start.
These above features of the industry, along with continued unbundling and restructuring
of  transportation charges, should support the  development of competition  in  gas  and
capacity markets and promote efficient functioning of the industry after full liberalization
of retail supply in 1998.37
Appendix
Structure and Regulation of the U.K. Natural Gas Industry
The natural gas industry in the U.K. has undergone dramatic changes in structure and
regulation. During the past  10 years deregulation has introduced competition in natural
gas supply to large and medium-size users, facilitated the development of independent
gas trading and supply companies, and gradually changed the operation of the pipeline
system. (See figure A. 1 for the structure of the U.K. natural gas industry.)
The deregulation has benefited end users through declining real prices for natural  gas.
According to data from the Department of Trade and Industry, between 1986 and  1995
residential prices fell by 24 percent in real terms, industrial prices by 47 percent, and
prices for electricity producers by 54 percent. The price declines were accompanied by a
38 percent increase in natural gas consumption between 1986 and  1995. The growth in
consumption was particularly strong among electricity producers, whose consumption
increased  by  2,100 percent,  and  commercial users, whose  consumption rose  by  104
percent. (For an overview of natural gas prices and consumption, see tables A.  1  -A.3 and
figures A.2-A.4.)
The natural gas industry in the U.K. has been transformed from a vertically integrated to
a  deintegrated industry. Before 1986 British Gas (BG) operated as a  publicly owned,
monopolistic  transporter  and  supplier of  natural  gas.  Only  production  was  open  to
competition,  and  it  was  dominated  by  multinational  oil  companies.  In  1986  the
government  privatized  British Gas  and partially  deregulated gas  supply.  British  Gas
retained its monopoly in supply to low-volume customers in the tariff market, but lost its
exclusivity in supply to high-volume customers in the contract market, where it competes
with about 40 independent suppliers.
About 40 companies are engaged in natural gas production and exploration. The major
production areas are in the North and Irish Seas, which produced 46 billion cubic meters
of gas in 1993, about 85 percent of domestic consumption. The remaining 15 percent (7.5
billioni cubic meters) was imported from Norway and Algeria. The share of imports in
natural gas supply has gradually decreased, from 22 percent in 1986 to 2 percent in 1995.
(For an overview of natural gas production and imports, see table A.4 and figure A.5.)
Suppliers'  means  of  acquisition  of  natural  gas  has  shifted  from  bilateral  long-term
conitracts  to medium- and short-term contracts and a spot market. Before 1989 British Gas
traditionally bought  100 percent of gas production under long-term contracts. Many of
those  contracts were  (and still are) "depletion" contracts. In an  attempt to  promote  a
policy of open access to the British Gas pipeline network, Ofgas introduced the 90:10
rule in 1989, which prohibited British Gas from contracting for more than 90 percent of
deliveries from any field on the U.K. continental shelf. The remaining 10 percent of gas
production became available to British Gas's  competitors - independent shippers and
suppliers. This rule forced producers to market their gas to buyers, and several producers38
set  up  marketing  affiliates. Producer prices  of  gas, or  beach prices,  were  subject to
negotiation  between  producers  and  either  British  Gas  or  independent  shippers  and
suppliers.
Initially, British Gas operated both natural gas supply and transportation as a merchant
pipeline.  In  1993  Ofgas  asked  British  Gas  to  build  "Chinese  walls"  (separating
accounting) between the transportation and supply arms. This led to the unbundling of
British Gas into British Gas Energy (BGE) and British Gas TransCo (BGT).
BGT operates transportation and distribution pipelines and storage. The pipeline network
is composed of the following segments:
*  The national transmission system - 5,900 kilometers of high-pressure pipelines.
*  Regional  transmission  systems  - about  12,500 kilometers  of  medium-pressure
pipelines.
*  Local distribution networks - about 232,000 kilometers of low-pressure pipelines.
*  Storage - seven storage facilities linked to the national transmission system.
The national transmission system contains six entry points, or terminals, where producers
can deliver their gas. In addition, gas can enter the system from BGT's storage facilities.
Gas leaves the system through about 80 exit points, organized into 34 exit zones. These
zones  coincide  geographically  with  the  34  local  distribution  zones,  which  contain
pipelines for the regional transmission systems and local distribution networks. Rates and
conditions for access to BGT's pipeline network are regulated by Ofgas under a mix of
rate-of-return  and  price  cap  regulation.  Rates  for  carriage  must  recover  BGT's
proportionate costs and return on capital, and they are subject to a price cap. BGT is a
monopolistic  provider  of  transportation  services and  pipeline  capacity  in  the  U.K.,
although other companies can construct and operate pipelines.39
Figure A.1 Structure of the U.K. Natural  Gas Industry
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1  Bilateral  natural  gas  contracts  between  producers  and  shippers  or British  Gas Energy  (BGE).
2  Natural  gas acquisition  in spot markets.
3  U.K.  Link  - communication  exchange  between  British  Gas  TransCo  (BGT)  and shippers  or BGE.
Facilitates  nomination,  allocation,  flexibility  and  capacity  bidding,  balancing,  and  invoicing.
4  Contracts  for pipeline  capacity  and  transportat'on  services  between  British  Gas  TransCo  and  shippers.
5  Natural  gas  supply  contracts.
The natural gas market is divided into contract and tariff markets. The contract market is
composed of consumers using more than 2,500 therms a year. It is open to competition,
and BGE competes directly with about 40 independent suppliers. The market share  of
British Gas fell from almost 100 percent in 1988 to about 80 percent in 1992. Prices are
subject  to  negotiation  between  consumers  and  BGE  or  independent  shippers  and
suppliers.  BGE  is  required  to  publish  its  rates  for  both  firm  and  interruptible  gas.
Published  rates must  disclose  a  charge for transportation and  an  energy component,
including conditions of transportation.
The tariff market is composed of consumers  using less  than 2,500 therms a  year. At
present, there is no competition in the tariff market, although a pilot program of retail
competition involving 500,000 consumers was launched in April  1996 in  southeastern
England.  There, BGE  competes  with  nine other suppliers.  In the  first  month  of  the
program about 6 percent of consumers switched from  BGE to another supplier, and it is40
expected that BGE will lose about 12.5 to 25 percent of the southeastern market (Ernst &
Young Energy Services Group 1996). In April 1997 another 1.5 million retail customers
were allowed to choose a supplier, and at the beginning of 1998 full retail competition
will be introduced. BGE is expected to lose about 25 percent of the entire tariff market
(Royle 1996).
The regulator of the gas industry is the Office of Gas Supply (Ofgas), which regulates
tariffs  and the industry structure. Other institutions with regulatory authority  over the
industry  include  the  Office  of  Fair  Trading  and  thle  Monopolies  and  Mergers
Commission, together  the  competition watchdogs,  and  the Department  of  Trade  and
Industry, the sectoral ministry.
Tariffs for tariff market customers are regulated by Ofgas on the basis of the following
price cap formula:
RPI -X+  GPI -Z+ E+ K, where
RPI is the retail price index.
Xis the productivity improvement factor, currently set at 5.
GPI is the gas price index, constructed by Ofgas to reflect British Gas's  average cost of
gas.
Z is the efficiency factor of GPI, currently set at 1.
E is the energy efficiency expenditure factor.
K is a correction factor that allows over- or underrecovery of costs in any particular year
to be corrected in later years.
Tariffs cannot be changed more than twice a year without the approval of Ofgas.
Tariffs  for  transportation  and  storage  are  also  regulated  by  Ofgas.  Tariffs  are  first
calculated to generate revenues that cover BGT's total costs and return on assets. Then
tariffs are subject to the following price cap formula:
Ml = [ 1 + ( RPIt -X)  / 100  ] Pt-, - K, where
Ml is the maximum revenue per therm transported by BGT.
RPI is the retail price index.
X is the productivity improvement factor, currently set at 5.
Pt  is the maximum revenue per therm that BGT was allowed to earn in the previous
year.
K is a correction factor that allows over- or underrecovery oi costs in any particular
year to be corrected in later years.
This formula came into effect on October 1, 1994, when BGT introduced a new structure
for transportation and storage charges.41
BGT  and  Ofgas  are  presently  engaged  in  talks  about  further  restructuring  of
transportation and storage charges to promote the efficient use of and investment in the
pipeline system and to unbundle and open to competition other lines of business, such as
service connection, emergency services, and meter installation and reading. Ultimately,
BGT  should operate  solely as  a  transporter of natural  gas and  a  provider of  system
balance and reliability in the deintegrated, unbundled natural gas industry.Table  A.1
U.K.  Gas Prices  Index,  1990=100
Current  Prices  (excl.  VAT)
Year  Beach  Residential  Industrial  El. Producers
1986  89.93  113.43  137.74
1987  89.05  106.78  110.53
1988  94.91  89.75  101.69  91.73
1989  99.02  93.64  98.31  100.00
1990  100.00  100.00  100.00
1991  108.61  106.89  100.91
1992  107.05  106.71  104.43
1993  102.15  102.60  102.74  106.17
1994  110.18  102.60  103.65  100.30
1995  109.59  104.13  90.35  96.69
Note: Gas Prices Index for Power Producers 1989=100
Source: DTI
Table  A.2
U.K.  Gas  Prices  Index,  1990=100
Real  Prices  (excl.  VAT)
Year  Beach  Residential  Industrial  El.  Producers
1986  114.12  143.94  164.36
1987  107.55  129.07  125.60
1988  108.02  102.22  115.78  98.30
1989  105.28  99.62  104.56  100.00
1990  100.00  100.00  100.00
1991  101.96  100.37  94.78
1992  96.09  95.79  93.74
1993  88.85  89.22  89.31  86.85
1994  93.93  87.54  88.40  80.48
1995  91.39  86.85  75.36  75.81
Note:  Gas Prices  Index  for Power  Producers  1989=100
Source:  DTITable  A.3
Natural  Gas  Consumption  in  the U.K.,  1986-1995
(GWh)
'(ear  Residential  Commercial  Industrial  El. Producers  Other*  TOTAL
11986  299,929  84,348  151,269  6,200  46,535  588,281
11987  307,578  86,664  164,442  6,200  49,041  613,925
11988  300,515  137,420  150,235  6,200  1,345  595,715
1989  290,557  134,403  160,050  6,200  -9,479  581,731
1990  300,410  138,446  164,993  6,400  -11,817  598,432
1991  333,963  158,738  158,354  6,561  -14,116  643,500
1992  330,101  150,795  147,584  17,894  -3,234  643,140
1993  340,162  153,975  148,707  81,778  -4,798  719,824
1994  329,710  156,315  164,557  114,575  2,180  767,337
1995  326,010  171,860  165,022  145,790  3,223  811,905
* Includes  public  administration,  agriculture  and  balancing  items
Source:  DTI
Table  A.4
Natural  Gas  Production  and Imports  in the U.K.,  1986-1995
(GWh  )
'(ear  Production  Imports  Total
1986  483040  137099  620139
1987  508126  128893  637019
1988  491249  115441  606690
1989  481257  113770  595027
1990  531377  79833  611210
11991  591795  72007  663802
11992  602322  61255  663577
11993  707685  48525  756210
11994  755763  33053  788816
1995  826722  19457  846179
Source:  DTIFigure A.2  Index of Current Gas Prices, 1990=100
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